When the Fear of War Enters Everyday Life

The possibility of war with Russia is no longer confined to military planning rooms. Across Europe, it is entering everyday life. Sweden’s government-issued crisis and war preparedness handbook, together with emergency guidance in Norway and the United Kingdom, encourages households to keep essential supplies of food, water, and other necessities sufficient for several days. The European Commission’s Preparedness Union Strategy, unveiled in March 2025, similarly calls for households to be able to sustain themselves for at least 72 hours.

These measures address a range of emergencies, including natural disasters, pandemics, and disruptions to critical infrastructure. Reading them as evidence that governments expect an imminent Russian attack would be misleading. Yet the inclusion of war in routine civilian preparedness reveals how profoundly Europe’s sense of security has changed—and how deeply anxiety about Russia has taken root.

Three developments lie at the heart of this shift: Russia’s growing reliance on military force and nuclear coercion; uncertainty over the durability of American security commitments; and Europe’s difficulty in expanding its defense capabilities at the pace circumstances demand. The underlying problem, however, is the widening gap between deterrence and the mechanisms needed to keep escalation under control. Türkiye’s security will also depend on how that balance is restored.

The Erosion of the Helsinki Order

During the Cold War, European security rested on more than military deterrence. Political dialogue and arms control provided an accompanying framework of restraint. NATO’s 1967 Harmel Report treated defense and détente as complementary tasks. The 1975 Helsinki Final Act established rules for relations among states without requiring ideological reconciliation. The 1990 Charter of Paris and the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit subsequently sought to give institutional substance to the prospect of a Europe that could overcome its divisions.

The gradual erosion of this framework reflected, in part, a failure to reconcile competing perceptions of insecurity. Moscow’s anxieties about NATO enlargement collided with the longstanding fears of Russia held by Central and Eastern European states. Recognizing both realities does not assign equal responsibility to all parties. By annexing Crimea in 2014 and launching its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia violated the principle that borders must not be changed by force. A state’s security concerns do not extinguish another state’s sovereignty or its right to choose its alliances.

The unraveling of conventional and nuclear arms control deepened the crisis. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the breakdown of the Open Skies and Conventional Armed Forces in Europe regimes diminished military transparency. The expiration of New START in February 2026 brought the loss of binding limits on American and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals into sharp focus. Europe was thus left to manage intensifying military competition with a steadily weakening framework of restraint.

The Baltic Crucible

Finland’s and Sweden’s accession to NATO has reshaped the military geography of northern Europe. Kaliningrad’s separation from the Russian mainland, together with the Baltic states’ concerns about the vulnerability of their supply routes, concentrates competing threat perceptions within a narrow geographical space. Moscow’s warning in late September that an attempt to isolate Kaliningrad could provoke a nuclear response offered a stark illustration of these tensions.

Assessing such risks requires a clear distinction between possibility and inevitability. On September 24, Danish military intelligence described a limited Russian attack as a growing risk. On September 30, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte stated that Russia posed no imminent threat of attack. These assessments underline the importance of distinguishing among a large-scale invasion, a limited military operation, and hybrid pressure. Each presents a different challenge, with its own indicators and potential responses.

The most immediate danger in the Baltic region may be that a limited incident becomes a test of political resolve. An airspace violation or an attack on critical infrastructure could generate pressure for retaliation before responsibility and intent have been established. Nuclear threats, intended to compel an adversary to retreat, can also raise the political cost of backing down.

Credible deterrence therefore needs reliable channels of direct communication and arrangements capable of establishing what has actually occurred. Without them, a local confrontation could acquire a momentum that neither side originally intended.

America’s Uncertain Commitment, Europe’s Unfinished Defense

For now, the adjustment of America’s role in European defense points more toward a redistribution of responsibilities than a definitive rupture. The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy envisages European allies assuming the principal burden of the continent’s conventional defense as Washington gives greater priority to homeland security and the Indo-Pacific. Yet NATO’s reaffirmation of collective defense at its Ankara Summit, together with the deployment of an additional American military unit to Lithuania, offers little support for the argument that the United States is abandoning the alliance altogether.

The difficulty lies in the uncertainty between present commitments and future political decisions. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty establishes the obligation of collective defense, while leaving allies to determine the form and scope of their assistance. The credibility of the American guarantee therefore rests both on the capabilities Washington possesses and on confidence that it will employ them when a crisis comes. An erosion of that confidence could encourage Moscow to test allied solidarity.

Higher European defense spending is necessary, but spending alone will not produce a coherent military capability. Joint procurement, air and missile defense, intelligence, strategic lift, and ammunition production must advance together. Otherwise, larger budgets may yield an accumulation of national capabilities that remain difficult to employ as a common force.

The contribution of the French and British nuclear deterrents likewise raises difficult questions about command authority, consultation, and political responsibility. A European defense posture capable of fully replacing American support in the near term remains an unreliable premise on which to base strategic planning.

China’s Strategic Dilemma

China’s declared position combines criticism of NATO with opposition to nuclear escalation. Its 2023 position paper on Ukraine criticized the expansion of military blocs while affirming respect for sovereignty and rejecting the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In May 2026, responding to a question about renewed Russian threats of attack, China’s Foreign Ministry called for de-escalation and a resumption of negotiations. The following month, Beijing rejected NATO’s accusations against China and accused the alliance of fueling confrontation. Taken together, these statements illuminate the broad contours of China’s approach to European security.

Beneath that position lies a strategic dilemma. Partnership with Russia gives China greater room for maneuver in its competition with the United States. An uncontrolled war in Europe, however, could severely damage Chinese trade and economic stability.

Nor would Beijing necessarily benefit from a reduction in American defense commitments in Europe if it allowed Washington to concentrate greater resources in the Indo-Pacific. China’s interests therefore provide grounds for caution about endorsing every political or military choice Moscow makes.

The practical significance of Beijing’s opposition to nuclear threats will depend on its willingness and ability to exercise restraint on Moscow. China could support crisis communication and verifiable measures to reduce military risks. Its close relationship with Russia, however, has created a deficit of trust in Europe that limits its capacity to act as a credible mediator.

Türkiye’s Security—and Its Voice

A serious NATO–Russia crisis in the Baltic region could bring immediate demands on Türkiye’s military planning, logistical support, and alliance solidarity. If tensions spread to the Black Sea, maritime trade, ports, and energy infrastructure could come under direct pressure. Ankara’s open diplomatic channels with Moscow would offer an important means of managing these risks, although dependence on Russia in energy and trade could constrain its freedom of action.

Türkiye’s priorities should include strengthening layered air defense and the resilience of critical infrastructure, diversifying economic dependencies, and maintaining a firm and consistent application of the Montreux Convention. By establishing predictable limits on naval access to the Black Sea, Montreux supports Türkiye’s ability to manage crises in a particularly sensitive strategic environment.

Closer cooperation with Europe’s defense industries also carries considerable promise. Its full value, however, will depend on access to technology and a meaningful voice in the relevant decision-making processes, alongside opportunities for joint production.

The Cuban missile crisis offers an enduring historical warning. The secret American assurance concerning the removal of Jupiter missiles from Türkiye formed part of the settlement that ended the confrontation in 1962. Ankara must have effective consultation and a meaningful say in any great-power understanding that directly affects its security.

The same principle applies to Ukraine. An arrangement that excludes a country from decisions about its own security cannot command lasting legitimacy.

Toward a New Security Compact

Türkiye could take the lead within NATO in adapting the Harmel approach to today’s conditions. Such an initiative would bring deterrence and diplomacy into a common strategic framework, with three practical components.

The first would be a transition agreement linking reductions in American forces and logistical support to the readiness of European replacement capabilities. Responsibility would shift as the capacity to assume it became available. Burden-sharing could then proceed without opening gaps in the alliance’s defenses.

The second would involve arrangements to prevent and manage military incidents in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, tailored to their distinct circumstances. Continuous communication among military commanders, advance notification of exercises, and expedited investigation of incidents could reduce the risk of miscalculation while preserving the right of self-defense. The mine countermeasures cooperation among Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria already demonstrates that narrowly defined, practical arrangements are possible in the Black Sea.

The third would be a new Istanbul process grounded in OSCE principles. With Ukraine and other directly affected states participating, it could address a ceasefire, security guarantees, and arms control as connected but distinct negotiating tracks.

Within this framework, a ceasefire line must not acquire recognition as a sovereign border. Commitments would need independent monitoring and agreed procedures to address violations. Any guarantor role undertaken by Türkiye would require a clearly defined mandate, the consent of the parties, and the capacity to fulfill the obligations involved.

The initial objective should be a set of limited, verifiable agreements that could create the conditions for a broader settlement. Nuclear risk notifications, regular testing of crisis hotlines, and temporary restrictions open to reciprocal verification could provide practical starting points.

Europe’s security depends on building the capacity to deter Russia while establishing rules that can keep confrontation with Russia under control. Türkiye is among the countries positioned to bring these requirements together in a credible diplomatic initiative.

Ankara’s strategic objective should be to translate its political and military contribution to European defense into a lasting voice in shaping the continent’s security arrangements. Growing recognition in major European capitals that a durable security order requires Türkiye’s participation provides an opportunity to advance that objective.

A Peace That Can Withstand Distrust

Europe’s historic challenge is to build a sustainable political order capable of securing its future. The prospect of diminishing American support, Russia’s reliance on coercive power, and China’s growing strategic weight expose the limits of a security model resting on external guarantees and separate national rearmament programs. Durable stability requires the capacity to deter aggression, principles that protect sovereignty, and binding arrangements that reduce the danger of nuclear escalation.

A new security compact must allow Russia’s security concerns to be negotiated, uphold Ukraine’s sovereignty, and ensure that European states retain an effective voice in determining their own future. Its credibility will depend on whether these principles can be translated into commitments that survive political confrontation.

Türkiye’s historical responsibility—and its strategic opportunity—is to use its standing within NATO, its defense capabilities, and its ability to speak with different sides to help construct that framework. The durability of peace in Europe will ultimately be measured as much by the rules that continue to function when trust disappears as by the trust that states are able to build.