‘bridging the intellectual gap’

"_________________________________________________________________________________________ INSIGHT The Future of the Rules-based International Order; to be restored, revised or replaced? Incek Debates, on 03 December 2025, discussed ‘The Future of the Rules-based International Order’. Speakers were Amb. Onur Öymen (retd), Ms. Tülin Daloğlu, LTG Nazım Altıntaş (retd) and Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal. The session was chaired by Dr. Haldun Solmaztürk and participated by a group of experts and professionals as well as members of the diplomatic corps resident in Ankara. This Rapporteur’s Summary does not necessarily reflect particular viewpoints expressed by any one panelist, nor those of any one or of all the participants in consensus. The debate was off-the-record. THIS IS NOT A COMPREHENSIVE PAPER ON THE SUBJECT, NOR MINUTES OF THE DEBATE, BUT ONLY RAPPORTEUR’S SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE, UPDATED AS OF 3 JANUARY 2026 (This is an abridged version of the Rapporteur's summary, with footnotes removed) Background The rules-based international order (RUBIO) also known as the ‘liberal order’ was established in the aftermath of WWII. It was based on certain international institutions, rules and norms—primarily the United Nations, UN Security Council and the UN Charter as well as others. Starting in the late 1990s, some decisionmakers came to believing that the system created half a century ago was no longer the best system that would serve their national interests. As a result, they stopped following established rules and respecting conventional norms. … The Incek Debates, in April 2017, discussed ‘How the disintegration of the liberal order impacted upon international relations and Turkish foreign policy’ and came to the conclusion that “Like Turkey, the world was in the grip of the most serious global political crisis since the 1960s. … Just as democratic regimes were threatened by anti-democratic alternatives, liberal international system was threatened by illiberal alternatives based on unilateralism, protectionism, short term interests and populism. … [However] The ‘fear of impending doom’ had mobilized democratic forces world wide to face the powerful challenge to democracy and to the emergence of a genuine liberal international order. … The future of democracy—and the liberal international order—looked brighter”. This is yet to happen. The second Trump administration effectively took over the role—and the authority—of the UN Security Council and President Trump himself that of the UN Secretary General. … Incek Debates revisited the subject and discussed the future of the rules-based order. … How did we get where we are now? In the course of the last 25 years the world has witnessed blatant violations of the ‘rules’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Gaza. But such violations of the UN Charter—its purposes and principles—had already started as early as the late 1940s. Self- defence was used as a blanket excuse and international law as a ‘tool box’ to resort to the use of force. Crises were designed, created and managed to serve the national interests of individual nations. So-called ‘securitization’ came to dominate the decisions regarding national interest. … Gaza was a breaking point in the history of the mankind in terms of the ‘order’ established after WWII. Both the brutal Hamas attack of October 7 and the disproportionate Israeli response to it which escalated to the scale of a genocide, while a helpless world—and incapacitated UN—watching in horror doomed the rules-based international order. … The order is collapsing The international environment is now a Hobbesian state of nature, and the rules-based order is turning into an interest-based order. The one ‘benevolent hegemon’ has resigned from the leadership role and responsibilities—as well as constraints of the old rules. … The Trumpian American ‘revolution’ has divided and polarized Europe. …there is an increasingly favorable approach to ‘far rigth’ movements at the expense of liberal values. It is an ongoing reverse wave of democratization, characterized by illiberal populism. … Restored, revised or replaced.? … The order as it was designed decades ago, had inherent flaws. It upheld equality but in practice it maintained and reinforced power asymmetries. It no longer responds to the needs of the world we live in today. ‘Restoring’ the kind of old order is not an option. Building a new, alternative system—to replace the old one—from scratch looks like a ‘bridge too far’. The only remaining option sounds like revising and reforming the old order. What kind of order.? The old order—with its institutions, norms and rules—was rigid and unresponsive. It should be redesigned in a more pragmatic, flexible and pluralistic form. First of all, we all need to look past civilizational patterns and establish global partnerships that are based on mutual respect and common good. … A pluralistic, multilateral global order—not necessarily strictly democratic—would foster cooperation and would be more adaptable, responsive, and resilient. … International institutions must be reformed; the power within the UN and other international bodies needs to be (re)balanced. Efforts, as a matter of priority, should focus on reforming the UN Security Council. … UN reform …Reform ideas, along with procedural reforms, revolve around re-structuring the Security Council and empowering the General Assembly to override the Security Council decisions to prevent permanent members from exploiting their veto rights paralyzing the Council. It would rely on both a strong Security Council and a strong General Assembly. Hence, the UN Security Council reform involves enlargement, that is increasing the number of permanent and non-premanent members, limiting the use of ‘veto power’, adopting more collaborative working methods and involving non-state actors. … The convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, half a century ago offers a successful example. Provided that both the ‘political will’ and the ‘leadership’ are there, it can be done. Who will do it? A global scale crisis of ‘leadership’ is standing in the reform’s way. … Whether the members of the United Nations—particularly the permanent members of the Security Council—will really embrace reform remains to be seen. … Small and developing states too, cannot possibly remain as bystanders; likewise, neither can they do it on their own—individually or in groupings. There must be a common will of both major powers and the so-called middle powers in coalition which is a function of leadership. The single critical factor appears to be the absence of a global leadership capacity. How to get there? …some members have to lead the way by example, by displaying their commitment to a reformed order. The simple fact that the deterioration was led by some of the former guarantors of the system presents a daunting problem. There is no blueprint on how to shape the future but the former leadership—and leaders—has to be replaced by a new leadership—and leadership style. Since major powers are either unwilling or unable to take on the job, it is time for middle powers to step in and to act. Middle powers’ leaders need to build a ‘coalition of the willing’ composed of a flexible network of states. Yet, this would require both gaining support of respective publics and engagement of the great powers—at least some of them. Both represent daunting challenges. … Civil societies, particularly think thanks and opinionmakers—supported by academia—would play a critical role in spreading the word by ‘discursive action’ to frame the ‘others’ in favorable terms and portraying a sense of unity among nations of the world. Through the transition period, while middle powers act as stabilising agents, dialogue and communication need to be maintained between the great powers. … However, at the end of the day, the leadership that is critically needed is nowhere in sight. Because there is no leader—or group of leaders—with an international standing, commanding a certain degree of respect and trust, having internalized democratic values free from ideological preoccupation, with reasonable time and ability to lead an international effort. … Addendum (3 January 2026) Major developments took place since this debate was held one month ago, on 03 December 2025. They largely—and ominously—confirm the findings and forecasts of the debate. …The new US National Security Strategy was released on 4 December 2025. It indicates that overall policy direction of US—divorced from liberal internationalism—is likely to continue, even if the democrats come to power or take control of the Congress. … On 9 December, in an interview with Politico, President Trump criticised “decaying” European countries and “weak” leaders. He pejoratively said that they were “weak”, wanted to be “so politically correct” and “They did not know what to do”. While singling out Hungary and Poland, he warned that what Europe was doing with immigration was a “disaster”. … On 21 December, President Trump appointed a special envoy to Greenland. In a BBC interview, citing its strategic location and mineral wealth, he said the US “needed” Greenland for “national protection” and that “We have to have it”. …President Trump, on 2 January 2026—without any reference to the UN or the Security Council—warned Iranian authorities that, “If Iran shots and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue. We are locked and loaded and ready to go. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”. …The United States, on 3 January 2026, captured the President of Venezuela by a large- scale military operation, to stand trial on charges of ‘narco-terrorism’ based on a ‘criminal warrant’ by an American court. President Trump said that US would run Venezuela, deploy American oil companies—with military back up, increase production, sell Venezuelan oil and get some of the money as “Reimbursement for the damages caused us by that country"". This was an open violation of the Charter of the United Nations, Article 2(4). Bottom line: The combined effects of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the exchange of missile salvos between Israel and Iran in 2024, American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025, Hamas’s 7 October attack and Israel’s conduct in Gaza and finally American aggression against Venezuela as well as verbal threats to Denmark, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba and even Canada have doomed the rules-based international order. The peoples around the world are ready for a reformed order, however it is a tragedy of humanity that leadership function is absent and the current chaos will continue for an indefinite period of time to come."