The war launched by the United States against Iran on 28 February—reportedly under the strong encouragement of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, whose political strategy has long been intertwined with regional tensions and confrontation—did not produce the swift collapse of the Iranian regime that Washington appears to have anticipated.
Despite suffering the loss of many senior political and military leaders, including key figures close to the Supreme Leader, Iran did not experience the popular uprising or regime collapse that some external observers had predicted. Unlike Venezuela, which has often been cited as a precedent for regime pressure, Iran did not capitulate easily.
Instead, Tehran responded by expanding the scope of the conflict. Through ballistic missile strikes targeting Israel and U.S. military facilities hosted by several Gulf countries, Iran signaled its willingness to regionalize the confrontation. Simultaneously, by effectively closing the Strait of Hormuz, Tehran demonstrated its capacity to disrupt global energy flows and place significant pressure on international markets.
This outcome appears to have challenged the initial expectations of U.S. policymakers. President Donald Trump—who had reportedly anticipated a rapid military success against Iran following an unprecedented military buildup in the region—began to publicly consider the possibility of a ground invasion. However, the political and military costs associated with deploying large numbers of American troops in a potential land war against Iran would likely face significant resistance in the U.S. Congress.
Consequently, Washington has reportedly explored alternative options. One such option—encouraged once again by Israeli strategic thinking—involves reaching out to Kurdish political groups operating in Iran and Iraq to assess whether Kurdish fighters could be armed and mobilized against the Iranian regime. To date, however, these exploratory contacts have not yielded encouraging results.
Iran’s Ethnic Structure and Demographic Distribution
Iran is a multiethnic state with one of the largest Kurdish populations in the Middle East. For this reason, discussions about the potential vulnerability of Iran’s political unity often intensify during periods of geopolitical tension. While ethnic Persians constitute the majority of the population, several significant minority groups are also present within the country.
The estimated demographic distribution is as follows:
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Persians: approximately 50–60%
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Azerbaijanis: approximately 15–20%
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Kurds: approximately 8–10%
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Arabs: approximately 2–3%
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Baloch: approximately 2–3%
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Turkmen and other smaller groups: less than 1%
Importantly, many of these ethnic communities reside along Iran’s border regions. Kurdish populations are concentrated in western provinces adjacent to Turkey and Iraq. Azerbaijanis inhabit the northwestern regions near the Republic of Azerbaijan. Arab populations are primarily located in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan, while Baloch communities live in the southeastern province of Sistan-Baluchestan along the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan.
In Western strategic discourse, the geographic distribution of these ethnic groups is often interpreted as a potential strategic vulnerability. However, it is equally clear that ethnic diversity alone does not necessarily lead to state fragmentation.
Historical Background of the Kurdish Question in Iran
The origins of the Kurdish issue in Iran date back to the early twentieth century. The most notable manifestation occurred in 1946 with the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad, founded with Soviet support in northwestern Iran. This entity collapsed shortly after Soviet troops withdrew, allowing the Iranian central government to reassert control. Despite its brief existence, the Mahabad Republic acquired symbolic significance as the first Kurdish state experience.
Today, Kurdish political organizations advocating autonomy largely operate outside Iran, particularly in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Compared with Kurdish groups in Iraq and Syria, their military capabilities remain limited. Consequently, the structural conditions for an independent Kurdish state in Iran have not materialized.
Institutional Strength and Resilience of the Iranian State
One of the main reasons why Iran’s fragmentation remains unlikely is the institutional strength of the Iranian state. Unlike several relatively young monarchies in the Middle East, Iran possesses deeply rooted state institutions and an extensive security apparatus.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) plays a particularly important role in ensuring domestic security. Equally important is Iran’s long tradition of centralized governance. Historically shaped by imperial state structures, Iran’s political system retains strong institutional continuity. Another stabilizing factor is the partial integration of ethnic communities; for instance, the fact that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is of Azerbaijani origin illustrates this degree of integration.
Regional Power Balances and the Kurdish State Question
The possibility of establishing a Kurdish state in Iran is shaped by regional geopolitical realities. Major actors—including Turkey, Iraq, and Syria—have consistently opposed Kurdish statehood. For Turkey, Kurdish separatism is closely linked to the conflict with the PKK. Ankara views any attempt to establish Kurdish statehood in neighboring countries through the lens of national security.
Similarly, recent agreements between the Syrian government under Ahmed al-Shara and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have effectively blocked ambitions for legal autonomy. The firm opposition of regional states constitutes a major obstacle to the emergence of a Kurdish state in Iran.
Possible Scenarios
Although current conditions do not favor Kurdish independence, the ongoing war could alter the political environment. On 22 February 2026, five Iranian Kurdish political organizations announced an alliance against the Tehran regime:
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Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK)
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Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI)
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Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK)
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Komala
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Organization of Struggle of Iranian Kurdistan
Particularly noteworthy is the presence of PJAK, an organization affiliated with the PKK and designated as a terrorist organization by Iran, Turkey, and the United States. Should the war continue and severely weaken Iran’s state institutions, scenarios involving political collapse or security breakdown could theoretically create conditions conducive to separatist movements.
Conclusion
Despite military pressure, several structural factors limit the likelihood of state fragmentation. Iran’s strong institutional framework, continued military resistance, the shift from domestic protest to national solidarity under external pressure, and the firm opposition of regional actors all contribute to preserving territorial integrity. Nevertheless, as long as the conflict continues, the political future of Iran will remain difficult to predict with certainty.
Ersin Erçin Ambassador (r) Vice President