I. Historical Background
The international order constructed in the aftermath of the
Second World War was not merely a collection of
institutions. It was, in essence, a civilizational project. It
rested on several foundational assumptions: that
subjecting states to common rules could prevent war; that
the liberalization of trade could enhance shared prosperity;
and that the universalization of human rights could expand
the legitimacy of political systems.
The institutional pillars of this project can be broadly
categorized as follows:
• Political-security axis: the United Nations, NATO, the
OSCE, the Arab League
• Economic-trade axis: the IMF, the World Bank,
GATT/WTO, the G7 and G20
• Legal-normative axis: the International Court of
Justice, the International Criminal Court, the Geneva
Conventions, and human rights treaties
• Regional integration frameworks: the European Union,
ASEAN, the African Union, Mercosur
For roughly seventy years, this architecture
functioned—imperfectly, unequally, and often in a
Western-centric manner, yet functioned nonetheless. It
prevented large-scale war among major powers,
expanded global trade, and facilitated the internalization
of certain norms.
Today, however, this order is unraveling. There is no
single cause. Rather, since the turn of the 21st century,
a range of structural, systemic, political, and
institutional dynamics have converged to accelerate this
process.
II. Structural Causes
1. Transformation in the Distribution of Power: From
Unipolarity to Multipolarity
The post-1945 order was fundamentally a product of
American hegemony—rooted in a combination of economic
dominance, military capacity, technological leadership, and
ideological appeal. Institutions both reflected and
reinforced this power.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, this hegemony
reached its zenith in the 1990s. Yet from the early 2000s
onward, the global balance of power began to shift:
• The rise of China: Now the world’s largest economy in
purchasing power parity terms, China has expanded its
military spending more than tenfold and emerged as a
global competitor in artificial intelligence, 5G, and
semiconductor technologies. Crucially, this rise has
occurred partly outside, or through the transformation
of, existing institutions rather than through their
endorsement.
• Russia’s revisionism: Despite limited economic
weight, Russia has demonstrated a capacity for
geopolitical disruption. Its interventions in Georgia
(2008), Crimea (2014), and Ukraine (2022) have directly
challenged the foundational norm of territorial integrity.
• Emerging middle powers: Countries such as Turkey,
India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia have
developed more autonomous foreign policy strategies,
resisting full alignment with major power blocs. The
concept of “strategic autonomy” has gained
prominence.
Institutions designed for a unipolar world have
struggled to adapt to this multipolar reality.
2. Crisis of Representation
A key weakness of post-1945 institutions lies in their
tendency to freeze the power balances of their founding
moment. The five permanent members of the UN Security
Council reflect the victors of 1945—not the geopolitical
realities of the 21st century.
Today, major actors such as India—with 1.4 billion
people—alongside the entire African continent and Latin
America, lack permanent representation. Similarly,
Germany and Japan, now leading global economies, were
structurally excluded due to their wartime defeat.
Voting structures in the IMF and World Bank have long
favored Western states, while developing countries have
often lacked the technical capacity to influence WTO
negotiations effectively.
This legitimacy gap has generated dual pressures: internal
demands for reform and external efforts to build alternative
institutions. Initiatives such as the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,
and the expansion of BRICS illustrate this trend.
3. The Paralysis of the Veto Mechanism
The veto power within the UN Security Council has evolved
from a stabilizing mechanism during the Cold War into a
source of systemic paralysis. Today, it often prevents
collective action:
• Russia, a direct party to the Ukraine conflict, retains
veto authority.
• China and Russia have repeatedly blocked resolutions
on Syria.
• The United States has used its veto extensively in
matters concerning Israel and Palestine.
As a result, the Council has increasingly become an
arena for great power rivalry rather than an instrument
of collective security—eroding its legitimacy,
particularly among smaller states.
III. Systemic and Economic Causes
4. The Tensions of Globalization
Since the 1990s, globalization—guided largely by the
Washington Consensus—has emphasized capital mobility,
trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, and privatization. While
these policies generated global wealth, their distribution
has been highly unequal.
In advanced economies, industrial employment declined
sharply, and middle-class incomes stagnated or fell. While
global inequality decreased, domestic inequality widened.
The 2008 financial crisis exposed both the inability of
international institutions to prevent systemic risks and
their limitations in crisis management.
This environment fueled the rise of populist movements
across Western democracies. These movements have
criticized international institutions for undermining national
sovereignty and serving global capital. Brexit and the
“America First” agenda exemplify this backlash.
5. The Dysfunction of the WTO
The World Trade Organization, once the backbone of the
global trading system, has faced significant erosion with
the following reasons :
• Negotiation failure: The Doha Development Round,
launched in 2001, remains unresolved due to deep
divisions between developed and developing countries.
• Dispute settlement paralysis: Since 2017, the United
States has blocked appointments to the WTO Appellate
Body, effectively disabling its enforcement mechanism.
• Regulatory lag: The WTO has struggled to address
digital trade, data flows, artificial intelligence, and
platform economies.
Consequently, global trade governance has shifted from
multilateral rules toward bilateral pressure and power
politics, exemplified by the U.S.-China trade conflict.
6. Technological Transformation
The institutions of the Cold War era were not designed to
address today’s technological realities. Cyber warfare,
artificial intelligence, and data sovereignty now occupy
central positions in international relations.
Yet global governance in these areas remains fragmented
or nonexistent. There is no binding international treaty on
cybersecurity .State-sponsored cyberattacks operate in a
gray zone. Competing models of data
governance—European, American, and Chinese—are
fundamentally incompatible.
Technological competition, particularly in semiconductors,
has further accelerated geopolitical fragmentation. Existing
institutions have been slow to respond, creating regulatory
vacuums increasingly filled by power politics.
IV. Political and Ideological Causes
7. The West’s Crisis of Legitimacy
Western states, which helped construct the normative
framework of the international order, have at times violated
these norms when it suited their interests.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq without UN authorization,
justified by false claims of weapons of mass destruction,
significantly undermined the credibility of international law.
Similarly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya—initially
framed under the “Responsibility to Protect”—evolved into
regime change, deepening skepticism among Russia and
China.
The persistent failure to implement UN resolutions on the
Israel-Palestine conflict has further exposed the gap
between legal norms and political realities.
Across the Global South, a widespread perception has
taken hold: international rules are flexible for the powerful
and binding for the weak.
8. The Rise of Nationalist Populism
Nationalist-populist movements have gained traction
worldwide, sharing several core beliefs: the primacy of
national sovereignty over supranational rules, skepticism
toward international institutions, and a preference for
bilateral over multilateral engagement.
From Trumpism in the United States to far-right movements
in Europe, as well as sovereignty-centered narratives in
Russia and China, these trends collectively challenge the
foundations of multilateralism.
9. The Political Awakening of the Global South
The erosion of the rules-based order is not solely a
Western crisis. Much of the developing world is
undergoing a profound shift in political consciousness.
Key drivers include a reassessment of colonial legacies,
the appeal of China’s development model, and the growing
emphasis on strategic autonomy. Countries such as India,
Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa increasingly resist
alignment with major power blocs.
The war in Ukraine crystallized this shift. Many countries in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America declined to adopt the clear
positions expected by Western states—reflecting not
support for Russia, but a broader skepticism toward the
existing order.
V. Institutional and Governance Challenges
10. Bureaucratic Rigidity
International organizations suffer from internal
inefficiencies, including overlapping mandates, excessive
bureaucracy, and slow decision-making processes. In a
world of rapidly evolving crises, this rigidity undermines
both effectiveness and legitimacy.
11. Financial Constraints
Dependence on member state contributions exposes
institutions to political volatility. Funding cuts—such as
U.S. decisions affecting UNESCO and broader UN
budgets—have created chronic financial instability. Even
the World Health Organization’s performance during the
COVID-19 pandemic was partly constrained by limited
resources.
VI. Environmental and Emerging Crises
12. Climate Change
Climate change represents perhaps the clearest example of
institutional inadequacy. Despite decades of negotiations
from Kyoto to Paris, progress has been insufficient.
The core tension lies between the long-term, collective
nature of the problem and the short-term, nationally driven
incentives of political systems. Moreover, climate policy
intersects with economic competition and energy security,
further complicating cooperation.
VII. Conclusion
In structural terms, the erosion of the rules-based
international order can be summarized as follows: the
distribution of power has changed, but institutions have
not adapted; legitimacy deficits have deepened without
meaningful reform; globalization has intensified
inequalities without adequate remedies; technological
change has outpaced governance; selective application of
norms has eroded trust; populism has weakened
multilateralism; and the Global South has asserted greater
autonomy without corresponding institutional
representation.These dynamics are not isolated—they
reinforce one another in a self-perpetuating cycle.
The unraveling of the current order does not signify the
end of history, but rather the beginning of a new struggle to
shape the international system. The central question is
whether a renewed order will emerge from negotiated
multilateral norms—or whether the world will drift toward a
system defined by raw power and unregulated competition.
The answer will define the trajectory of the 21st century.