Incek Debates, on 25 February 2026, discussed ‘The future of new Syria and the challenges that the Syrian Arab Republic is faced with’. Speakers were Amb. Ünal Çeviköz (retd), Ms. Qian Xinyi of the Embassy of China and BG Ali Er (retd). The session was chaired by Dr. Haldun Solmaztürk and participated by a group of experts and professionals as well as members of the diplomatic corps resident in Ankara.
This Rapporteur’s Summary does not necessarily reflect particular viewpoints expressed by any one panelist, nor those of any one or of all the participants in consensus. The debate was off-the-record.
(This is an abridged version of the Rapporteur's summary, with footnotes removed)
As a result of the ‘lightning offensive’ launched by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) on November 27, 2024, Bashar al-Assad left Syria on December 8. Various groups united under HTS leadership have now gained statehood within the Syrian Arab Republic under Ahmed al-Sharaa's leadership. Sharaa was declared ‘president’ by the ‘Victory Conference’ on January 29, 2025, when HTS was officially disbanded. Simultaneously, the 2012 Ba'ath Constitution was abolished, the army, police and the parliament were dissolved, and the HTS became the Syrian army. The Transitional Government was formed on March 29, 2025.
The ‘new Syria’ has turned towards the West and the West is also willing to recognize it as a legitimate political entity. Sharaa solidified his personal international legitimacy by addressing the UN General Assembly on September 24. On November 10, he was received—albeit by a side door—at the White House and met with President Trump. Immediately after the visit, the Sharaa government announced its participation in the Global Coalition Against ISIS. In early 2026, Syrian and Israeli officials, meeting in Paris under US mediation, agreed to establish a ‘Joint Fusion Mechanism’ under US supervision. The Sharaa administration is seeking cooperation with Turkey and Arab countries too. It is also open to communication with Syria's traditional allies, the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, but a return to the ‘good old days’ may never be possible.
Stability within the country and the establishment of full state authority in some areas—east of the Euphrates, Alawite and Druze regions—despite some progress, still remain elusive.
The PYD/YPG/YPJ political/military structure has used the name Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for its ‘armed’ wing and the ‘Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’ or ‘Rojava’ for its political structure since 2015. Their goal has been to be part of a secular, democratic and federal Syria. Since the March 10, 2025 agreement between SDF and Damascus was not implemented, clashes between the Syrian army and the SDF began in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor and Raqqa in October. … Eventually, on January 30, 2026 the Syrian government and the SDF reached an agreement for a permanent ceasefire and a framework for SDF’s integration into Damascus military and administrative structures….
The way this prominent Syrian problem is resolved concerns Turkey.
…Sharaa envisages a transition period of at least four years—if not longer—for reconstruction of institutions, a real constitution, and proper elections. The transition process inherently carries many risks. Conditions are unfavorable and the transition is painful.
Incek Debates, in December 2019, discussed ‘If an end to the war in Syria was in sight’ and came to the conclusion that “Turkey did not have an exit plan, nor an ‘exit strategy’ with a clear ‘end state’ in mind. …Turkish political ‘end state’ in Syria looked like a moving target shifted by developments beyond Turkey’s control. Turkish government’s short-sighted intervention in Syria in 2012 eventually created conditions for making the most-feared nightmare—greater Kurdistan—a self-fulling prophecy.” … Turkish officials gave the impression that they would tolerate a Kurdish (not PYD/YPG) ‘Rojava’ under American protection..." "The developments …had turned Syria into an international chessboard. …Whatever shape Syria might take in the future, there would be no return to the status quo ante bellum. But the exact final shape would be determined by the outcome of the ongoing chess game.”
Incek Debates revisited the subject and discussed the challenges facing the ‘New’ Syria, how to overcome them and what initiatives key actors can possibly take.
The Sharaa administration is faced with daunting challenges. The multiplicity of fault lines may lead to a renewed fighting. Inspiring confidence in the majority of citizens and securing their consent to the Sharaa government of ‘political Islam’ is a major challenge. Consolidating political control over the armed forces and establishing discipline is still incomplete. State structures are broken; the constitution and the parliament are of the transition period only.
Fully integrating Kurds into national institutions remains a challenge. Syrian economy is in ruins; high inflation and high unemployment have left the majority under the poverty line. Criminal networks, armed groups are active in parts of the country. Millions are displaced; needs for basic services are overwhelming, a third of the housing stock is destroyed.
The challenges require a progressive, incremental approach rather than sweeping schemes for remedies. Provided that comprehensive and meaningful reforms can be embarked upon, the Sharaa government may pave the way forward towards stabilisation and reinstitution. But Syria cannot possibly succeed without sustained international engagement in all aspects of the transition and continued foreign leverage for many years to come—at least a decade.
A UN Security Council Resolution is needed; Syria needs to be reintegrated into the global economy; lifting sanctions along with a clearly demonstrated commitment to reforms will make life easier for Sharaa government. Efforts of the international community need to be coordinated and reviewed via structured frameworks and the progress be monitored in regular conferences.
Turkish officials appear satisfied with the current arrangements related to SDF.
Syrian file is embedded in a transforming order in the Middle East and a transforming international system. Stability in Syria requires de-escalation beyond Syria, therefore it will be very much dependent upon the U.S. decision to intervene in Iran.
…Turkey and Israel confront one another indirectly in Syria and the strategic friction between the two risks direct confrontation. Israel aims to maintain its control over Syria, to keep Iran and its proxies off and the Sharaa government on a very short leash. The U.S., appeasing Turkey, aims to maintain a ‘Kurdish’ entity within Syria as autonomous as possible—and under the ‘supervision’ of the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq. Europe remains distanced but refugee-focused.
…If Syria fails the consequences will not be confined to Syria. The priority must be preventing Syria from sliding back into a renewed conflict and chaos that would end up in a failed state. The so-called international community has played a ‘role’ in regime-change in Syria—some nations more fundamental roles than others. Without foreign intervention the history may have developed in quite a different way in Syria and beyond. Now it’s time to pay a debt.
The present involvement of the international community is uncoordinated, short-term, in a haphazard way and piecemeal. As for Turkey, it clearly seeks a major role in Syria. …Turkey cannot afford Syria to fail. Turkey wants a legal framework that ensures a unitary Syria, its territorial integrity preserved. Initially Turkish officials sounded adamant about ‘individual’ integration of SDF members into the ‘Syrian’ army. This did not happen; to the contrary, the SDF has now officially recognized four brigades with full combat power. However Turkish officials appear satisfied with this arrangement as they remain silent on this contentious subject. …
Bottom line: …If escalation persists in Gaza and if Iran–Israel tensions intensify, Syria will not stabilise; instead, fragmentation risks becoming permanent. Calls for federalism and decentralized governance are likely to continue. Stability in Syria therefore requires de-escalation beyond Syria. …Stabilisation will be very much dependent on the US decision to intervene in Iran. (February 25, 2026)
By the Rapporteur.
On February 28, three days after this debate took place, Israel and the U.S. launched air and missile attacks on Iran—Operation Epic Fury. Attacks were first initiated in the form of ‘assassinations’ targeting the top Iranian political and military leadership to include Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who lost his life. Iran responded by launching missiles and drones toward Israel, Gulf countries and US assets across the region. …When President Trump agreed to a two-week ceasefire to allow negotiations, there was a general sense of optimism. Proximity talks in Islamabad on April 11 led to face-to-face talks between the U.S. and Iran. At the time of the release of this Summary on April 12, negotiations between the U.S. and Iran had collapsed. …The U.S. declared a naval blockade of Iran starting on April 13. …
Joe Kent, who had resigned earlier in March, made an unprecedented remark over a potential Turkey-Israel clash in Syria and criticized US Middle East policy hinting that it was conditioned by Israel. A prominent Russian senator was quick at jumping at his comments: “It sounds like geopolitical fiction. But if you consider that in Israeli political circles Turkey is called the second enemy of Israel after Iran, then everything starts to look different”.
The slogan of “No quarter, no mercy for our enemies!” voiced by the US Secretary of ‘War’ Hegseth echoed similar calls from dark eras of human history. Yet he was honest enough to express it since this was exactly what Israel did in Gaza just as what Hamas had done on October 7. This call as well as “A whole civilization will die!” statement, both are emblematic of a certain political culture. The world has reached a historical juncture; we are witnessing a turning point. Peoples and leaders alike have lost confidence in the U.S.-led global order. Late Henry Kissinger among others had warned that this was coming, back in 2001. A new world order is emerging.
Thanks to the current Israeli government, Israel now has a deeply ingrained ‘blood feud’ with Arabs, and politically—and morally—isolated itself from the rest of the world. The U.S. has lost much of its credibility and reliability and its reputation has sunk—probably for good. Particularly in the Middle East, the standing of the West has dropped and cooperation—even association—with the U.S. has become a political liability for regional leaders. This situation will have adverse effects on Syrian politics, put an additional strain on Sharaa, encourage ISIS and further destabilize the country.
